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Abstract
Much of the debate surrounding contemporary studies of terrorism
focuses upon transnational terrorism. However, historical and
contemporary evidence suggests that domestic terrorism is a more
prevalent and pressing concern. A formal microeconomic model of
terrorism is utilized here to understand acts of political violence in a
domestic context within the domain of democratic governance.This
article builds a very basic microeconomic model of terrorist decision
making to hypothesize how a democratic government might influence the
sorts of strategies that terrorists use. Mathematical models have been
used to explain terrorist behavior in the past. However, the bulk of
inquires in this area have only focused on the relationship between
terrorists and the government, or amongst terrorists themselves. Central
to the interpretation of the terrorist conflict presented here is the idea
that voters (or citizens) are also one of the important determinants of
how a government will respond to acts of terrorism.
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Variance, Violence, and 
Democracy: A Basic 
Microeconomic Model of 
Terrorism 
By John A. Sautter
Introduction
Much of the debate surrounding contemporary studies of terrorism 
focuses upon transnational terrorism. However, historical and contempo-
rary evidence suggests that domestic terrorism is a more prevalent and 
pressing concern. A formal microeconomic model of terrorism is utilized 
here to understand acts of political violence in a domestic context within 
the domain of democratic governance.
Terrorism is the use of violence and threats to intimidate or coerce for 
political purposes.1 Unlike purely conventional military conflict where 
two opposing armies meet on a battlefield, terrorism focuses violence 
directly on civilians to affect political change through altering public opin-
ion.2 Within the modern day context, terrorism as a calculated political 
tool must be thought of within democratic institutions, and for good rea-
son. History shows not only that an insurgent or terrorist organization 
can influence electoral outcomes, but that as a society becomes more 
democratic rates of terrorism tend to increase.3
This article builds a very basic microeconomic model of terrorist decision 
making to hypothesize how a democratic government might influence the 
sorts of strategies that terrorists use. Mathematical models have been 
used to explain terrorist behavior in the past.4 However, the bulk of 
inquires in this area have only focused on the relationship between terror-
ists and the government, or amongst terrorists themselves.5 Central to the 
interpretation of the terrorist conflict presented here is the idea that vot-
ers (or citizens) are also one of the important determinants of how a gov-
ernment will respond to acts of terrorism.
Domestic Terrorism and Democracy
A major focus of terrorism studies, especially since September 11, 2001, 
has been on ideologically motivated, transnational terrorism. However, 
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whether one views this topic historically or in the contemporary context, 
transnational and religiously motivated incidents are much less frequent 
than might at first be obvious. An examination of the ITERATE collection 
of acts of terrorism during the past thirty years shows that a majority of 
incidents was neither international in scope nor initiated by religiously 
motivated groups.6 Furthermore, most terrorist acts over this period were 
caused by individuals indigenous to the state in which they occurred, with 
the victims being largely from those states as well.7 Without a doubt, 
domestic terrorism is as important as the transnational case.
There are distinct features that set domestic models of terrorism apart 
from transnational ones. First, the idea that the victim and the terrorist 
are from different populations, or countries, is either the assumption 
made in an international focus, or the issue is completely ignored. In 
domestic terrorism it is often the case that clandestine groups recruit 
from all parts of society and share the same nationality with those that 
they are attacking.8 Second, transnational models of terrorism rarely, if 
ever, model the main tool of violent political groups, terror itself. It is 
often treated as an intangible variable that cannot be accounted for.9 
Indeed, in the transnational context it may very well be impossible to 
place such a concept into the workings of an economic model, however 
important it may be to policy outcomes. Finally, asymmetric information 
and signaling is very different in each.10 Domestic terrorism, as conceived 
here, is a method of signaling used by a political dissident to attempt to 
directly sway a citizenry, whereas transnational terrorism is usually con-
ceived as indirect influence.
Research has demonstrated the importance of democratic institutions in 
explaining the frequency of terrorism. The prevalence of democratic insti-
tutions has a positive relationship with incidences of terrorism.11 This is 
generally ascribed to liberal rules and freedoms under a democratic 
regime, which allow terrorist organizations to organize freely. Indeed, evi-
dence suggests that as government institutional obstruction to democratic 
expression decreases, so do incidences of terrorism.12 One way to think of 
this is by understanding that individuals will be more likely to take advan-
tage of the political process as opposed to violent opposition to it when 
the costs of political participation are much lower.13 When there are fewer 
obstructions to participation, its costs are inherent lower.
The model developed below assumes three different agents. There are ter-
rorists (t), voters (v) and politicians (g).14 Terrorists aim to commit illegal 
acts to further their political beliefs. Voters want to maximize safety and 
stability. Politicians desire re-election and will optimize government anti-
terrorism policy in order to maximize re-election. A democratic system of 
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government with direct election for representative government is 
assumed in the model. In short, terrorists attack voter-citizens, voters 
decide their government, and the government adopts a policy toward ter-
rorists.
Terrorist Utility
T  = T (D, π, G ) - C (D*) (1)
A terrorist's utility is a function of three different variables. Where D is 
some amount of damage that a terrorist would like to commit and D* is 
the chosen amount of damage that they will attempt. The cost constraint 
C (.), is a function of the chosen damage that the terrorists will attempt to 
commit. π is the probability of successfully completing the intended act or 
acts of terrorism. G is a proxy for the mean government policy in the past. 
Government policy includes counterterrorism efforts, implementing 
security measures or any other government activity that was implemented 
to retaliate against or protect from terrorist activities. We assume that  
and  are both > 0, or that a terrorist's utility is increasing in both the 
amount of damage that they are able to inflict, as well as, the probability 
of success. However,  < 0, or that as the government policy toward ter-
rorists is increased, a terrorist will get disutility.
Finding the first order condition:
(D, π, G)   = C' (D* ) (2)
The first order condition shows that a terrorist is constrained by the cost 
of their chosen amount of damage. D* is the theoretical combination of 
terrorist acts, Di, (i = 1,2,...), that amount to different ways of committing 
violence, or,
D* =  Di ( G (D), π) (3)
A terrorist will maximize his utility by choosing the optimal D* that solves 
equation (2) given a certain probability of success and the current govern-
ment policy toward terrorism. The government policy from the terrorist 
perspective is a function of the mean of all past violent activities, D.
D∂
∂T
π∂
∂T
G∂
∂T
∂T
∂D
i
m
∑
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Voter Utility
Vi = V (D
*, π, G, ρ, θ (u, D*)) (4)
Voter, or citizen, utility is some function of the same variable inputs: D*, 
π, G. Rho is a theoretical parameter that measures the rate at which voters 
discount past acts of terrorism over time, where 0 < ρ < 1.15 This models 
the behavior that a voter weights the future much more than the past. 
Prior to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, most Americans did 
not perceive a terrorist threat, though the risk of a successful attack was 
obviously high. Conversely, the overhaul of airline security regulations, a 
new emphasis on the threat posed by terrorists in governmental intelli-
gence organizations and the establishment of a Homeland Security 
Administration have significantly reduced the danger of future terrorist 
attacks that abounded before 9/11. However, the public perceives that the 
risk of future attacks is in fact higher. Voters are assumed to place more 
emphasis on future risks than they do on the whole for past events.
As a stochastic variable, u represents all other things in society that could 
become more important to a voting public than a threat posed by terror-
ism, including economic conditions, erosion of civil liberties or corruption 
in government. The parameter θ (.) is some function of u between zero 
and one, so that < 0 and  > 0. The first term illustrates that 
when damage is held constant other issues in the political atmosphere 
begin to outweigh the importance of inputs D*, π, G in the voter utility 
function, sending θ ??0. However, the second term denotes that there is a 
positive second derivative with respect to D* and u, showing that theta 
increases when there is a simultaneous increase in both D* and u. This 
makes θ increasing in damage even if other political issues are concur-
rently in the political debate. It is assumed that in the absence of an 
increase in D, u, will rise over time as other issues enter into the political 
landscape. For the purposes of explaining the model, θ is set to one in 
equation (4) so that a focus can be placed on the variables D*, π, G.16
Voter maximization is also affected by a chance constraint that takes into 
account the probability of damage.
Pr { D* ≥ G (D)} ≥ π (5)
Equation (5) is a probability density function that ensures that the proba-
bility of receiving positive damage: D* - G (D) > 0, is greater than or equal 
u∂
∂θ
D
2
∂
∂ θ
∂u*
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to π. In other words, the terrorist act is greater than the historic mean of 
government policy, thereby incurring damage. D* is a random variable 
that, while in the voter utility function, represents the amount of eco-
nomic damage or violence that terrorists have committed during the cur-
rent round of attacks. Voters have information regarding the historic 
mean and standard deviation of D*since they are aware of the terrorist's 
density function and the variance of their past acts of violence. While past 
violent acts of terror provide information to voters on the scope of D*, it 
should only be regarded as a theoretical general guide to them. For exam-
ple, if one knows that in the past suicide bombers have ridden buses, this 
informs one on the inherent risks of riding the bus. However, this general 
knowledge does not inform one of the specific time, day and place of an 
act of terror that is random for the typical citizen.
In the chance constraint, < 0, indicating that as the amount of damage 
increases, the probability of success decreases. This follows from the fact 
that generally attacks that kill a larger number of people or inflict more 
economic damage are normally more complex, costly and involve a higher 
probability of failure. Equation (5) can be re-written as:17 
[Pr {D* > G} > π]  σ D * γ (1 - π) + μ D * - G(D) (6)
Which combined with equation (4) gives the following voter utility 
function:
Vi = V (D
*, π, G; ρ, θ (u)) + G(D) - σ D * γ (1 - π) - μ D * (7)
Where σ D *and μ D *are the standard deviation and mean of D*; and 
γ (1 - π) is a function that delineates the number of standard deviations 
that D* must be from D, the mean of all past damage, in order to satisfy 
the constraint.
Voters are interested in safety and national security. Though D*, π, G, are 
exogenous to the voter's utility function, they are seen as maximizing util-
ity when the government pursues a policy, G, that provides for the most 
stability to society. Following a terrorist attack, voters will evaluate the 
government based on their perceptions of how the administration 
responded to the attack. Therefore, voters feel the effect of the following 
maximization problem:
max     Vi = V (D*, π, G, ρ, θ (u)) + G(D) - σ D * γ (1 - π) - μ D * (8)
π∂
∂D
≈
G
*
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Solving for the first order condition in equation (8):
 =    +    +  -    γ '(1 - π) -  +      = 0 (9)
Equation (9) describes the effect on voters' utility with a change in gov-
ernment policy in response to a terrorist attack. For this example, theta is 
presumed to be equal to one.
Each term describes how a voter reacts to the damage perpetrated by ter-
rorists in light of the government response to the damage and can be 
interpreted as either an expression of sensitivity to the terrorist violence 
(alpha) or as a sensitivity to the government response (beta). Accordingly,
αi =     γ '(1 - π) +  (10)
and,
βi =     +  +     +      (11)
Equation (10) is the summation of partial derivatives that equal alpha or 
the sensitivity to terrorist violence, and equation (11), beta, represents the 
terms that are equal to the sensitivity to the government response. The 
difference in alpha and beta, βi - αi = 0, will always be equal to zero. If it 
did not equal zero, then the government can be understood as not 
responding to the political violence in a proportionate and effective man-
ner. Therefore in this model, it is assumed that the government will con-
tinue to play the game round to round, and will always have a response. 
The significance of this measure is where these two sides of voter utility 
meet in policy space. As shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 below, the impor-
tant feature of this model is its ability to show why terrorists use the 
methods that they choose. By expanding the variance and decreasing their 
mean level of violence, terrorists can decrease government response and 
increase their signaling potency on the average voter or citizen.
Terrorists are attempting to cause fear and panic in order to sway citizens 
into pressuring the government into making political concessions. Each 
one of the expressions in alpha causes negative utility for the voter. The 
first term,    γ '< 0 is a kind of "terror" term that reflects how an increase 
in the standard deviation of acts of damage changes with respect to gov-
ernment policy. It illustrates the disutility that a voter receives from an 
increase in the randomness of violence. The second term,    < 0 repre-
sents a "strength" of terror term and depicts the change in the mean level 
G∂
∂V
D∂
∂V
G∂
∂D
π∂
∂V
G∂
∂π
G∂
∂V
G∂
∂σ
G∂
∂μ
D∂
∂G
G∂
∂D
G∂
∂σ
G∂
∂μ
D∂
∂V
G∂
∂D
G∂
∂V
π∂
∂V
G∂
∂π
D∂
∂G
G∂
∂D
G∂
∂σ
G∂
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*
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of violence associated with terrorism. All of the expressions in the α equa-
tion are decreasing in government policy.
The β equation models the voter sensitivity to the government policy. The 
first term,   .  < 0, can be called the "violence" term and represents 
the negative utility that voters receive from the act of damage and the gov-
ernment's initial response to the violence. The next term,  .  >0, 
demonstrates that voters' gain utility from seeing the terrorists' probabil-
ity of success decrease as the amount of government policy toward terror-
ism increases.  > 0, is a "safety" term. Voters garner positive utility 
from the reassuring feeling and stability that an increase in government 
policy brings to society. The final expression in the β equation,  .  > 
0, is an "updating" term that represents the way voters garner utility from 
seeing the government change its policy to match the new threat posed by 
an increase in the E (D*), or the new expected future value of damage.
Government Utility
P = P (ε; δ )
Where: ε = ε ( αi ( D*, π, G),   βi ( D*, π, G, ρ, θ)) (12)
The government utility function is only concerned with getting re-elected. 
The incumbent government will optimize G, given D* and π, which are 
both exogenous to P (.), so as to maximize ε, the chance of re-election. 
Delta is a parameter that represents the rate that office holders discount 
the future, where 0 < δ < 1.18 Unlike voters, who place more emphasis on 
the future, politicians are assumed to place more importance on the 
present. Indeed, if not elected in the forthcoming round of elections, the 
government will have no say in the policy toward terrorists anyway. In 
effect, the sum of voters' utility is nested within the government's utility 
function and expressed by the way that voters feel toward the govern-
ment. The parameter "n" is any hypothetical number of voters in a state 
and "i" represents each individual voter.
Government utility maximization is also constrained by a chance con-
straint that takes into account an incumbent's chances of getting re-
elected.
D∂
∂V
G∂
∂D
π∂
∂V
G∂
∂π
G∂
∂V
D∂
∂G
G∂
∂D
i
n
∑
i
n
∑
*
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Pr { β > α } > ε (13)
Equation (13) is a condition that ensures the government will maximize 
its counterterrorism policy in an attempt to make the following equality 
hold: βi - αi = 0. The government desires to make ε, their chance at re-
election, equal to one. In other words, the current administration desires 
to maximize the probability of staying in office. This is dependent on their 
ability to defeat the terrorists. If the equality stated above does not hold, 
the government is seen to have lost its ability to fight the terrorists and 
would thus not be re-elected to office.
Interpreting the Model
An increase in damage only changes the government crackdowns by a 
marginal amount as compared to a change in the level of α,19 which would 
bring a similar change in G and D. An increase in the probability of suc-
cess for the terrorists arises from an increase in variance of violence, shift-
ing Beta away from the G = D* line. The flatter the slope of the Beta 
expansion path, or the higher proportion of damage D compared to the 
government policy of G(D*), the higher the probability that violence will 
succeed with a smaller crackdown from the government. Alpha represents 
a constrained probability of success, which is inherently determined by 
the choices of the terrorists in the strategy they will use. The decision to 
pursue easier targets versus more complex and dangerous ones alters the 
level of the alpha expansion path in the policy space.
Figure 1: Graph showing the effect of an increase in variance of violent 
acts in policy space.
i
n
∑
i
n
∑
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A change in the mean level of violence will raise alpha, increasing D. How-
ever, notice that under this form of damage policy the terrorists can 
expect a substantially larger crackdown from the government than if they 
had increased their variance. Also, notice that a higher mean lowers the 
probability of success, which would eventually begin to push the beta line 
toward the G = D* line, making the government reaction even closer to 
being the same as the increase in damage. Or, in terms of Figure 1 and 
Figure 2, we would say that:
D1
* - D1 > D2
* - D2 and, G2
* - G2  > G1
* - G1 
Terrorists will desire to keep their mean level of violence low, so as to 
avoid a costly government attack. There will be a better chance of commit-
ting more violence and terror on the general public by adopting a strategy 
that increases the variance of attacks while decreasing its mean level.
Figure 2: Graph showing the effect of an increase in the mean level of 
violence in policy space.
Conclusion
Democratic governments should deal with terrorists early and with impu-
nity before they are allowed to gather enough resources for a larger attack. 
This may seem obvious. However, there is not always the necessary public 
support to provide resources for a police action against insurgents or to 
enact the necessary security laws to avert future attacks. What this model 
suggests is that the government should undertake such actions even when 
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there is little public support. This conclusion is somewhat at odds with the 
notion of democracy being a form of government that protects civil liber-
ties. In many respects, this is the paradox of domestic terrorism and 
democracy: how to provide security for a citizenry when some of those 
you wish to protect are hostile to their own government.
The connection between electoral government and terrorism is impor-
tant. The study of how each party involved in the three-way relationship 
depicted here reacts to the actions of the other two parties can provide 
insight into how best to manufacture policies aimed at curbing terrorist 
incidents. One of the most striking results of this investigation is the basic 
realization that there are trade-offs in a democratic system that a terrorist 
or insurgent group must make between large attacks which draw the 
scorn of the public, and thereby the government retribution; as compared 
to small, more varied, attacks that harass the populace but do not create a 
large government backlash.
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